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On our
SELECTION
Simon Marginson responds that while the old 
'progressive' orthodoxies in education may be threadbare, 
the Left's opposition to selection is still a valid one.
an Hunter's work is always valuable 
because it is novel, it is carefully 
thought through and it is generative. 
It makes us think. We do not have to 
agree with his political assumptions or con­
clusions in order to draw value from what he has 
written.
However, I disagree with his article above. I don't think 
that Ian has succeeded in laying to rest the education 
politics of equality of the 1970s and 1980s, although he has 
uncovered some limitations and weaknesses. Nor has he 
succeeded in justifying what he sees as the alternative: the 
meritocratic practices of grading, sorting and selecting in 
education, which were the unquestioned orthodoxy of the 
1950s and most of the 1960s, and still dominate the educa­
tion system.
Hunter sees the demand for equality in education in nar­
row terms, as the demand for "equality of qualification", a 
refusal by teachers to engage in these practices of grading 
and selecting to the extent that limits are placed on what 
students can do after they leave education. This has been 
an important form of educational equality, but it is not the 
only form.
Equality in education can also be understood in terms of 
equality of respect; the refusal to work within the framework 
of hierarchies and domination/subordination (or in its 
softer version, the modification of traditional educational 
authority). It can also be understood in more conventional 
political terms as equal rights of citizenship. Hunter's 
article largely neglects these aspects of equality.
Hunter discerns a "structural ambivalence" in progres- 
sivist education policy. He says that there has been a vacil­
lation between two contradictory goals: the complete
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development of each student, and the improvement of the 
techniques of educational selection to make selection more 
fair and accurate.
Some reformers have wanted to get rid of the selective 
functions of education altogether, because selection 
prevents at least some students—and arguably, all stu­
dents—from achieving "complete development'. Hunter 
mentions the claim that educational selection is implicated 
in the creation of social privileges. Another and related 
daim is that it always tends to discriminate against the 
sodally 'disadvantaged'.
In the politics of upper secondary education those voices 
demanding abolition of selection have been joined to a 
larger group who share Hunter's own goal (as expressed 
here by T H Marshall) of wanting to "purge" educational 
selection of all "inexplidt sodal residues" in order to "free 
the distribution of social rights from earlier systems based 
on the transmission of inherited cultural and economic 
wealth"—in other words, to refine educational selection so 
as to establish a 'fair' system.
I think he is right about the existence of this ambivalence 
between abolition of selection and reform of selection, 
although, as I shall argue, he has defined the case for 
abolition too narrowly. The Victorian Certificate of Educa­
tion (VCE) embodies this ambivalence. It wants to treat 
every student in much the same way and on equal terms, 
and it would like students from all sodal groups to succeed 
equally well, but it also provides a raft of detailed informa­
tion about each student, enabling employers and univer­
sities to differentiate and discriminate more predsely than 
under the old HSC.
I would argue that, while the ambiguity of the radical 
position helped to provide a wide political base for the 
egalitarians, it was to catch them out in the end. It robbed 
the pressure for the abolition of selection of any coherence 
and consistency, and it also confused the moderates. There 
was never an agreed benchmark or measure with which to 
demonstrate with predsion the distance between the status 
quo, and a 'fair and neutral' system, that remained to be 
travelled. And the 'fair and neutral' system was never 
dearly defined.
Hunter assodates the demand for the abolition of selection 
with a rhetoric of "the cultural development of humanity" 
in which the role of education is to release the true nature 
of the individual (in Hannan's words, "to preserve the 
extraordinary gifts they are born with") in a process of total 
and integrated development. In relation to this idea, any 
selection, by definition, can only be stultifying.
)
Hunter is right to link this vision to the ideal of universal 
humanity, to the desire of humanist intellectuals to project 
their "caste practice" as the essence of education. Where I 
think that Hunter is seriously wrong is in his belief that this 
argument in itself constitutes a suffident dismissal of the 
opposition to educational selection.
This point is vital. Hunter's renundation of reform, his 
slide back to the status quo ("the right of students to enter 
unequal sodal and occupational statuses on the basis of 
demonstrated differences in their scholastic abilities") 
depends on the assumption that there are only two pos­
sible positions: an opposition to educational selection that 
derives from ideas about human essences and total 
development, or the willing acceptance of selection 
modified only by some fine-tuning of the techniques.
Hunter strengthens the case in favour of selection by draw­
ing the opposition to selection in narrow terms. This is a 
'straw man' argument. He implies that all of the critidsms 
of educational selection are contained within the humanist 
rhetoric about total development. But I don't think that 
rhetoric is suffident to contain all even of Hannan's argu­
ment, let alone all possible arguments.
There are also positions in this debate other than the ones 
dted in Hunter's quotes from Hannan. The opposition to 
educational selection of the terminating kind—in other 
words, selection that cuts off the future options of some 
students—has often sprung from ideas about universal 
partidpation in education, and empowerment through 
education. For example, at least three further reasons to 
oppose this form of educational selection can be advanced.
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First, it can be argued that the social and cultural biases in 
the techniques of educational selection are not technical 
blips capable of being removed by a more 'scientific', 
vigilant or honest approach. Rather, these biases are fun­
damental to any processes of this type and, as such, cannot 
be eradicated.
Second, it can be argued that power exercised by 
educators—the power to terminate a student's progress 
towards a wide range of occupations, and the income and 
status benefits that follow—is an illegitimate one.
Third, managed competition in education draws much of 
its rationale and its form from nineteenth century social 
Darwinism which was influential at the time that the 
universal systems of elementary public education were 
being established. This educational competition specifical­
ly links educational performance to high levels of in­
dividual student anxiety. This is barbaric, and it has not 
been satisfactorily demonstrated that it improves perfor­
mance, scholastic or otherwise.
Now some brief comments on the first two of these points. 
Hunter talks about the concern that "the procedures of 
assessment and selection are not fulfilling their technical 
ends; for example because they are assessing students on
the basis of inherited cultural style rather than trained 
scholastic abilities". He says that the unequal outcomes of 
education should be based on "unequal scholastic perfor­
mance"—"purged" of those measures of ability "not ex­
plicitly transmitted by the school system". Once this 
process of "purging" is complete we will then have 
genuine equality of opportunity, the career open to the 
(trained) talents.
If only it were so easy. Hunter has skipped over the sorry 
history of all of the efforts to construct such a fair educa­
tional competition. It has proved not only difficult, but 
impossible.
Despite successive waves of education reform in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the Whitlam tertiary education reforms in the 
1970s, and the increase in tertiary education participation 
in the 1980s and 1990s, obvious inequalities of outcome by 
social group remain. Students from more affluent homes 
continue to display the most "ability". In national-cultural 
terms, anglo-celtic students continue to perform best in 
school subjects heavily reliant on the use of language. Of 
course, inequalities have not stayed the same. For example, 
to the extent that they were influenced by socio-economic 
factors, the social group inequalities in education were 
reduced by the abolition of fees and the introduction of 
student allowances. But the problem of unfair selection 
remained.
The clear conclusion from this experience is that social 
biases in academic achievement can be modified, but they 
cannot be eradicated. Even the abolition of the schools set 
up to concentrate educational privileges— the elite private 
schools—could not do that (although it would help). Bias 
in selection would remain because the educational com­
petition is conducted in terms of a "common culture" 
which is native to some social groups but not others. Stu­
dents learn and are examined in the terms of a common 
middle class anglo-Australian culture. It is inevitable that 
a common culture will begin from particular groups. It 
does not come out of the blue. (This is one of the problems 
facing egalitarian reformers who argue for such a common 
culture.)
Thus, while educational success itself comes normally to 
the anglo-celtic child from the affluent private school, for 
others even success may be bought at a high price. Because 
they set out to create standards, schools can fragment 
identities and marginalise whole cultures. In the form of 
multiple curricula, multiculturalism is one way through, 
but it makes 'objective' educational selection more difficult 
because the different groups of students are being ex­
amined with differing criteria. Hunter's article does not 
have a sense of these problems.
The strength of Hunter's portrait of the education profes­
sion is that he emphasises that its role cannot be reduced 
to 'broader forces', whether economic or cultural. Educa­
tion is one of the institutions that makes culture and society. 
What is surprising is his complacency about the exercise of 
this power.
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Hunter describes the history and development of the 
educational professions in terms of "the technical character 
of educational thinking and organisation". The role of 
teachers has been to manage the population and to allocate 
it to the different social destinations. The implication is that 
it is 'unrealistic' to consider removing the function of selec­
tion.
I have little quarrel with the history as Hunter has outlined 
it. But it is possible to ask whether the fates of the popula­
tion should be assigned in this way. Is it enough simply to 
say 'that is the way things are' as Hunter seems to do? This 
method of argument is, to say the least, politically disa­
bling. It does not at all follow that because particular forms 
of educational selection have been used in the past that 
they will continue to be used in the future.
Further, it can be argued that, ethically, the power of educa­
tional professionals over the social futures of 'their' stu­
dents is repugnant. Like some other powers which have 
now passed away, it would be better if it was not exercised, 
and education was organised in a different way, with 
objectives other than selection made more prominent in its 
business.
For example, selection into work could be carried out by 
employers and perhaps also at the point of entry into 
post-graduate vocational training. The functions of social 
selection would no longer be masked by liberal education­
al discourse. Their specific mechanics would be more clear­
ly revealed . Em ployers would be forced to take 
responsibility for selection decisions.
As Hunter notes, egalitarian reformers have sought to 
modify the professional power of educators by the 
dem ocratisation of schooling, the introduction of 
mechanisms of decision-making "to bring the formative 
structure and logic of schooling within the sphere of 
popular control". He does not encourage such efforts. His 
argument is that the "specific set of political and intellec­
tual technologies" in education, and the "technical or­
ganisation of the school system", may not be compatible 
with democratic procedures or democratic assumptions 
about equal rights. Differentiation between people is com­
patible with inequality, but not with equality.
Of course, an education system dominated by administra­
tive techniques is not conducive to democratic procedures. 
The point of democratisation is to modify substantially the 
role of the traditional school and system administration, 
and classroom management. Hunter's description of the 
profession shows why it is difficult to bring about 
democratic reforms in education. He does not show that 
they are impossible.
As Hunter's account shows, the limited outlook of the 
egalitarian reformers may be one of the obstacles. He cites 
Hannan's statement that egalitarian reforms "cannot be 
left to the decision of school communities". As Hunter says, 
this is scarcely com patible with an argum ent for 
democratisation. In that respect, the old progressivism 
(like leninism) has been contradictory, forced to rely on the
insupportable claim that it knows the 'real' popular inter­
ests better than the people in whose name it acts. This may 
help to explain the political isolation in which the VCE- 
driving Victorian government now finds itself.
However, there is no necessary contradiction between 
educational egalitarianism and democracy. The recent his­
tory of school reform illustrates that parents who become 
closely involved in the running of local schools are often 
inclined to support egalitarian changes to grading and 
selection.
The role of the educational profession as outlined by 
Hunter is now being modified by two radically different 
and often opposing forms of 'user' or 'consumer' power. 
There is the politics of local involvement in decision­
making (especially in Victoria, SA and the ACT). There is 
also the market economics of Friedman and Hewson. Pay­
ment of fees would enable the would-be university student 
to circumvent the rigours of academic selection. In their 
different ways both the market and democratic politics are 
implicated in the question of equality, even though they 
tend to produce very different notions of 'fairness' and 
'equal chances' from those produced by the techniques of 
educational selection.
Hunter's article is characteristically incisive. It is unfor­
tunate that he has been so selective. He has concentrated 
on taking apart the radical egalitarian position. Rather than 
developing another left position, one more suited to the 
times perhaps, he has given us the old 1950s goals of 
equality of opportunity and a fair selection system. Yet I 
believe that the idea of an objective or neutral educational 
selection is no longer convincing. It is now widely under­
stood that, with the best will in the world, educational 
ability and educational selection are subjective, arbitrary 
and even corruptible.
The selection of students for occupational and social des­
tinations is neither inevitable in its present form, nor is it, 
as he implies, something that is relatively unproblematic 
It contains political and ethical problems that need to be 
faced. There is never any shortage of reasons for turning 
away from egalitarian goals and winding back to the status 
quo. But a return to the status quo solves nothing except, 
sometimes, our own personal and individual dilemmas 
about survival.
This does not mean that we must implement our own 
individual 'liberated zones' in education, free of the baleful 
influence of selection and competition, etc Another lesson 
of the 1970s is that this approach is not effective. The 
problems raised by the question of educational selection 
cannot be dealt with through the decisions of single in­
dividuals working in the professional sphere, and need 
once again to be made the object of a collective and political 
practice. There is little to be gained from individual bad 
conscience, except therapy.
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